Hedonic games provide a general model of coalition formation, in which a set of agents is partitioned into coalitions with each agent having preferences over which other players are in her coalition. We prove that with additively separable preferences, it is Σ p 2 -complete to decide whether a coreor strict-core-stable partition exists, extending a result of Woeginger (2013). Our result holds even if valuations are symmetric and non-zero only for a constant number of other agents. We also establish Σ p 2 -completeness of deciding non-emptiness of the strict core for hedonic games with dichotomous preferences. Of more general interest, we prove that TRUE-∃∀-3DNF remains Σ p 2 -hard even if no variable occurs more than three times.
Introduction
Suppose agents wish to form coalitions, perhaps to jointly achieve some task or common goal, with the payoff to an agent depending on the make-up of the coalition the agent is joining. In many situations, it makes sense to model agents' preferences to only depend on the identity of the players in a group. This model was introduced by Drèze and Greenberg (1980) and termed hedonic games, because agents in a hedonic game can be seen as deriving pleasure from each other's presence.
An agent in a hedonic game specifies a preference ordering over all sets (coalitions) of agents. An outcome of the game is a partition of the agent set into disjoint coalitions. A player prefers those partitions in which she is part of a preferred coalition.
The main focus of the literature on hedonic games is studying those outcomes that are stable (Banerjee, Konishi, and Sönmez 2001; Bogomolnaia and Jackson 2002) .
Of the many notions of stability discussed in the literature, the most prominent is the concept of the core. A partition π of the agent set is core-stable if there is no non-empty set S of agents all of which strictly prefer S to where they are in π. Intuitively, if the state of affairs were π, then the members of S would find each other and decide to defect together because π does not offer them enough utility. In this case, we say that S blocks π. A related concept is the strict core. The partition π is strict-core-stable if there is no set S of agents all of which weakly prefer S to π, but with at least one agent i in S having a strict preference in favor of S. Intuitively, i can offer some of his profit of the deviation to the other players, inducing S to deviate from π.
Computationally speaking, hedonic games are large objects: every player is described by a preference ordering over exponentially many sets. However, there are attractive concise representations of such preferences, many of which have been studied in the computer science literature (Ballester 2004 . Given a concise representation (which usually is not universally expressive), it makes sense to pose the computational problem of finding a stable outcome given a hedonic game. Since many games do not admit stable outcomes, we can conveniently consider the decision problem whether one exists. This problem turns out to be NP-hard for most cases (see Peters and Elkind (2015) for a systematic study of representations inducing NP-hard core-existence problems, and Woeginger (2013a) for a survey). In particular, the case of additively separable hedonic games is an example of a class of succinctly represented hedonic games where it is hard to distinguish games admitting stable outcomes from those who do not (Sung and Dimitrov 2010) . In this model, agents assign numeric values v i (j) to other players, and the utility of a coalition is the sum j∈S v i (j) of the values of the players in it. In general, core-existence is contained in the complexity class Σ p 2 because the question under consideration is characterised by a single alternation of quantifiers: "does there exist a partition π such that for all coalitions S, S does not block π?", where we always assume to be able to efficiently decide whether a given coalition S blocks. Alternatively, since Σ p 2 = NP NP , we can see containment through the following nondeterministic algorithm: guess a partition π, and use the NP-oracle to check whether π is core-stable.
In the case of additively separable games, it is coNPcomplete to verify that a given partition π is core-stable (Dimitrov et al. 2006) . Thus, it is unlikely that the core-existence problem is contained in NP. And indeed, Woeginger (2013b) proves that it is Σ p 2 -complete. The problem thus encapsulates the full hardness of the second level of the polynomial hierarchy, making it, as Woeginger argues, much harder to decide than NPcomplete problems. (He likens NP-complete problems to "rotten eggs" while Σ p 2 -complete problems are at the level of "radioactive thallium").
On the other hand, the practical tractability of problems in NP should make us optimistic that stable partitions can be found in a practical sense. In particular, it seems impractical for a very large coalition S to form in order to block a given partition π. If we say that a partition is stable if there is no blocking coalition of size at most k (for fixed k), then the existence problem for this solution concept is in NP, since to verify the stability of a given partition we merely need to check the O(n k ) possible blocking coalitions.
Preliminaries
Given a finite set of agents N , a hedonic game is a pair G = N, ( i ) i∈N , where i is a complete and transitive preference relation over
If S i T , we say that i weakly prefers S to T . If S i T but T i S, we say that the preference is strict and write S ≻ i T . An agent is indifferent between S and T whenever both S i T and T i S. An outcome of a hedonic game is a partition π of N into disjoint coalitions. We write π(i) for the coalition of π that contains i. If π(i) i {i} for each i ∈ N , then π is individually rational. We say that a non-empty coalition S ⊆ N blocks π if S ≻ i π(i) for all i ∈ S. Thus, all members of a blocking coalition strictly prefer that coalition to where they are in π. The partition π is core-stable if there is no blocking coalition. A nonempty coalition S ⊆ N weakly blocks π if S i π(i) for all i ∈ S, and S ≻ i π(i) for some i ∈ S. The partition π is strict-core-stable if there is no weakly blocking coalition. Clearly, if π is strict-core-stable, then it is also core-stable. There are many other stability concepts for hedonic games that we do not consider here, see Aziz and Savani (2015) for a survey.
A hedonic game has dichotomous preferences, and is called a boolean hedonic game, if for each agent i ∈ N the coalitions N i = {S ⊆ N : i ∈ S} can be partitioned into approved coalitions N + i and non-approved coalitions N − i such that i strictly prefers approved coalitions to non-approved coalitions, but is indifferent within the two groups: so S ≻ i T iff S ∈ N + i and T ∈ N − i . We can specify a boolean hedonic game by assigning to each agent i ∈ N a formula φ i (i's goal ) of propositional logic with the propositional atoms given by the agent set N . A coalition S ∋ i is then approved by i if and only if S |= φ i , that is the formula φ i is satisfied by the truth assignment that sets variable j ∈ N true iff j ∈ S.
A hedonic game is additively separable, and is called an additive hedonic game, if there are functions v i :
The complexity class Σ p 2 , the second level of the polynomial hierarchy, is NP NP , the class of problems solvable by a polynomial-time non-deterministic Turing machine when given an NP-oracle. It can also be seen as the class of problems polynomial-time reducible to the language TRUE ∃∀-QBF, which consists of true quantified boolean formulas with only 1 alternation of quantifiers.
Related Work
Boolean hedonic games were introduced by Aziz et al. (2014) who study them from a mainly logical point of view. (Notice that they use a different choice of propositional atoms-pairs of agents-to allow future generalisations to games played on general coalition structures. Our choice is more natural for the hedonic setting.) In particular, Aziz et al. (2014) show that every boolean hedonic game admits a core-stable partition. Thus, only the complexity of the existence of the strict core needs to be settled.
Elkind and Wooldridge (2009) introduce a representation formalism for hedonic games called hedonic coalition nets (HC-nets), which can be seen as a powerful mixture of the two representations introduced above. Here, agents provide several goals φ i weighted by real numbers, and an agent obtains as utility the sum of the weights of the formulas that are satisfied by the coalition. Thus additively separable games are given by HC-nets in which every formula is just a single positive literal, and boolean hedonic games are given by HC-nets in which every agent has only a single formula. It follows from a general result of Malizia, Palopoli, and Scarcello (2007) that coreexistence is Σ p 2 -complete to decide for games given by HC-nets. We strengthen this to also apply to the strictcore, and to hold even if either every agent only has a single formula, or if every formula is given by a single literal. This paper is inspired by the work of Woeginger (2013b) who proves that deciding core-existence is Σ p 2 -complete for additive hedonic games. His reduction (from the same problem that we reduce from) does not work for the strict-core, and in his survey (Woeginger 2013a) he poses the problem to establish Σ p 2 -hardness for this solution concept. Doing this is the main contribution of this paper. We also strengthen Woeginger's (2013b) result for the core to hold even for symmetric valuations, and even if v i (j) is non-zero for at most 10 agents j. This closes off two avenues for potential avoidance of Σ p 2 -hardness.
A useful restricted hard problem
In his seminal work, Stockmeyer (1976) proved that the following problem is Σ p 2 -complete:
Instance: A quantified boolean formula of form ∃x 1 , . . . , x m ∀y 1 , . . . , y n φ(x 1 , . . . , x m , y 1 , . . . , y n ), where φ is in disjunctive normal form with each disjunct containing 2 or 3 literals. Question: Is the formula true?
Here we show that the problem remains Σ p 2 -complete even if we place restrictions on the number of occurrences of the variables, like is standard practice when proving NP-completeness.
RESTRICTED TRUE ∃∀-3DNF
Instance: A quantified boolean formula of form ∃x 1 , . . . , x m ∀y 1 , . . . , y n φ(x 1 , . . . , x m , y 1 , . . . , y n ), where φ is in disjunctive normal form with • each disjunct containing 2 or 3 literals,
• each x-variable occurring exactly once positive and once negative • each y-variable occurring exactly three times, and at least once positively and at least once negatively. Question: Is the formula true?
Let us note that a true ∃∀-3dnf-formula is the same thing as a false ∀∃-3cnf-formula; we will use this latter view since CNF formulas are more familiar.
Thus, we may reduce from the unrestricted problem false-∀∃-3cnf.
We will in polynomial time transform a given such formula ∀x 1 , . . . , x m ∃y 1 , . . . , y n φ(x 1 , . . . , x m , y 1 , . . . , y n ) into a formula of equal truth value which is restricted as above, establishing hardness of the restricted variant.
First, by unit propagation, we may assume that no clause contains only a single literal. Next, for each x-variable x i , relabel all its occurrences as y 
to force all copies to have the same truth value. Similarly, for each old y-variable, we relabel all its occurrences (existentially quantifying) and add a 'wheel of implications' for those as well (here we may discard the old y-variable in the process). The resulting formula satisfies the restrictions as stated and has the same truth value as the original formula.
By using the techniques of Berman, Karpinski, and Scott (2003), we can similarly prove that the problem remains Σ p 2 -complete if disjuncts are required to contain exactly 3 distinct literals, each x-literal occurs exactly once, and each y-literal occurs exactly twice. For the reductions in this paper, we do not need this particular restriction.
Strict Core for Boolean Hedonic Games
Theorem 2. The problem "does a given boolean hedonic game admit a strict-core-stable partition?" is Σ p 2 -complete.
Proof. Membership in Σ p 2 is clear, since we are asking: does there exist a partition such that for all coalitions S, S does not block?
For hardness, we reduce from RESTRICTED TRUE ∃∀-3DNF. Let ϕ = ∃x∀yφ be an instance of this problem, where x = (x i ) and y = (y j ) denote vectors of variables. We rewrite ϕ as ∃x(¬∃y¬φ). Note that ¬φ is a 3CNF formula, and when below we talk about clauses, we are always referring to clauses of ¬φ. In the hedonic game which we construct below, a strict-core-stable partition corresponds to an assignment to the x-variables. If there is a y-assignment satisfying ¬φ (so that ϕ is false), this will form a (weakly) blocking coalition. If the formula is true, such a blocking coalition cannot exist.
For our construction, we take the following agents:
• For each y j , two agents y j , y j .
• For each clause c k in ¬φ, one agent c k .
• A single player ϕ representing the formula.
We now specify agents' goals. For a clause c k of ¬φ, we let ℓ 
This boolean hedonic game has a strict-core-stable outcome if and only if ϕ is true.
=⇒ : Suppose ϕ is true. Take an assignment A to the x-variables certifying truth of ϕ. Then take the partition π with coalitions {t i , x i , x i } for true x i , with coalitions {f i , x i , x i } for false x i , and singleton coalitions for all other players. We show that π is strict-core-stable.
Most agents' goals are satisfied in π, with the only exceptions the true x-literals and the player ϕ. If π is not stable, then there is a weakly blocking coalition S including a player whose goal is satisfied in S but not in π; also, no other player in S can be worse off in S than in π. Now the profiting player cannot be a true x-literal, for if this player were to gain then its complementary literal must be part of S and this literal would lose. Hence any weakly blocking coalition S must include the ϕ-player and must satisfy it. Looking at ϕ's goal, this means that c 1 ∈ S. Indeed, by induction, c k ∈ S for all c k , since c k ∈ S cannot be worse off in S, and thus c k 's goal must be satisfied, which requires c k+1 ∈ S.
The goal of every c k is satisfied, which means that the literals present in S must satisfy each clause of ¬φ. This means that the literals present in S satisfy ¬φ. This contradicts truth of ϕ under the assignment A once we can show that S does not contain complementary yliterals, and only contains true x-literals. But both of these requirements are easy to see: since all y-literals have their goal satisfied in π, they must have their goal satisfied in S, which means their complementary literal is not part of S. Also, a false x-literal is happy in π but would be unhappy in S since t i , f i ∈ S, and thus false x-literals are not part of the weakly blocking S. Hence π is strict-core-stable.
⇐= : Suppose the game has a strict-core-stable outcome π. We show that ϕ is true.
First we will find an appropriate assignment to the x-variables. Fix some variable x i . Since the goals of x i and x i are incompatible, at most one of them is happy in π. If both are unhappy, then {t i , x i , x i } weakly blocks. Hence for each x i , exactly one of x i and x i has their goal satisfied. Define the assignment that sets that literal true which is not satisfied.
Soon we will need to know that the ϕ player does not have its goal satisfied in π. For a contradiction suppose it does. Then x 1 ∈ π(ϕ) or x 1 ∈ π(ϕ). Since x 1 or x 1 has their goal satisfied in π, both of them are together with either t 1 or f 1 . So either t 1 ∈ π(ϕ) or f 1 ∈ π(ϕ); but then {t 1 } or {f 1 } blocks π, a contradiction. Now take an arbitrary assignment to the y-variables, and suppose for a contradiction that under these assignments to the x-and y-variables the formula φ becomes false, so that ¬φ becomes true so every clause is true. Let S be the coalition consisting of player ϕ, all clauses c k , all true x-literals, and all true y-literals. In S, every player except for the true x-literals is satisfied, so no player is worse off. However ϕ did not have its goal satisfied in π, so is strictly better off in S, and hence S weakly blocks π, a contradiction. Thus, ϕ must be true.
Note that hardness holds even if every agent mentions at most 5 other agents in their goal, and even if goals are given in 2-DNF or 4-CNF.
Strict Core for Additive Hedonic Games
The reduction presented for the dichotomous case can with some effort be implemented using additive valuations. This is what we do in this section.
Theorem 3. The problem "does a given additive hedonic game admit a strict-core-stable partition?" is Σ p 2 -complete. The same question for the core is also Σ p 2 -complete, and both problems remain hard even for symmetric utilities that only assign non-zero values to at most 9 other players. Proof. Membership in Σ p 2 is clear, since we are asking: does there exist a partition such that for all coalitions S, S does not block?
For hardness, we reduce from RESTRICTED TRUE ∃∀-3DNF. Let ϕ = ∃x∀yφ be an instance of this problem, where x = (x i ) and y = (y j ) denote vectors of variables. We rewrite ϕ as ∃x(¬∃y¬φ). Note that ¬φ is a 3CNF formula, and when below we talk about clauses, we are always referring to clauses of ¬φ. In the hedonic game which we construct below, a (strict-)corestable partition corresponds to an assignment to the x-variables. If there is a y-assignment satisfying ¬φ, this will form a blocking coalition. If the formula ϕ is true under the assignment to the x-variables, such a blocking coalition cannot exist.
Before we start, let us add a new x-variable (call it x * ) to the formula and add the clause c 1 := (x * ∨ x * ) to ¬φ. This preserves the truth value of the formula, and preserves the restrictions of the input problem. This will help in the proof of implication (iii) ⇒ (i) later.
We take the following agents:
• For each x i , four agents x i , x i , t i , f i .
• A helper player c ′ k for each c k and helper players t
and f ′ i for t i and f i associated with x i . In Table 1 , we specify agents' symmetric utilities, see also Figures 1 and 2. All utilities not specified in the table are 0; the figures also omit −∞ valuations for clarity. As notation, for a literal ℓ, we let c(ℓ) denote the clauses that contain ℓ; for x-literals there is just 1, but there are up to 2 for y-literals. We also let ℓ(c) denote the literals occurring in c. We take arithmetic in subscripts of clause names (as in 'c k+1 ') to be modulo the number of clauses in ¬φ. We show that the following are equivalent:
(i) The input formula is true.
(ii) The game admits a strict-core-stable partition. (iii) The game admits a core-stable partition.
Call a coalition S feasible if it is individually rational (and in particular does not contain players who evaluate each other as −∞), and if each 'supported' player . All values not specified are 0. The value "−∞" denotes any sufficiently large negative number; −100 will do. Notice that the valuations are symmetric (vi(j) = vj (i)) and every agent specifies at most 10 non-zero values, noting that we can ensure that no clause contains more than 2 x-literals.
(those that have a helper player: c k /t i /f i ) obtains utility 30 in S. Call a coalition infeasible otherwise.
Observe that all coalitions in a core-stable partition must be feasible (as otherwise it is not individually rational or a coalition like {c k , c ′ k } blocks). Observe further that if a partition is weakly blocked by some coalition, then it is weakly blocked by a feasible coalition. This formalises the intuitive purpose of the helper players: they guarantee a minimum payoff to the supported player in any stable outcome. Suppose not, and there is a weakly blocking coalition S which we may assume to be feasible. The following players are in a best coalition among feasible ones: false x-literals, t i /f i players together with literals, c ′ k , and paired t
Lemma. In a feasible coalition
Since S is weakly blocking, it contains a player p who strictly prefers S to π. This p cannot be on the preceding list. Now p also cannot be a t i /f i player together in π with its helper for it cannot offer its associated literals a feasible coalition as good as they have in π. Also, p cannot be a singleton t ′ i /f ′ i as t i /f i will be less happy in feasible coalitions together with t
Hence, p is either a true x-literal, a y-literal, or a c k player. In the former two cases, S must also include the clause player associated with the literal p. So in either case S includes a clause player, and by the Lemma, since we cannot be in case (a), S must contain all clause players, and enough literals to satisfy every clause. This means that the literals present in S satisfy ¬φ. This contradicts truth of ϕ under assignment A once we can show that the literals in S form a valid assignment, i.e. S does not contain complementary y-literals, and only contains true x-literals. But both of these requirements are easy to see: by feasibility of S no y-literal has their complementary literal in S (since they hate each other). Also, a false x-literal would be worse off in S since t i , f i ∈ S by feasibility since t i , f i hate a clause, and thus false x-literals are not part of the weakly blocking S. Hence π is strict-core-stable.
(ii) ⇒ (iii): Strict-core-stability implies core-stability.
(iii) ⇒ (i): Suppose the game has a core-stable outcome π. We show that the formula is true. Recall that every coalition in π must be feasible. Write i ∼ j for agents i, j that appear in the same coalition in π (so ∼ is the equivalence relation associated with π).
First we will find an appropriate assignment for the x-variables. Consider variable x i . It cannot be that both x i ∼ c(x i ) and x i ∼ c(x i ) for then by the lemma all clause players are together in π, which implies x i ∼ t i , f i (since they hate a clause) and so x i obtains utility 5 − 10 = −5, contradicting feasibility. If exactly one of x i and x i is together with clause players, say x i ∼ c(x i ), then x i must obtain utility 0 (by feasibility for f i and t i ), and thus {x i , x i , f i } blocks, a contradiction. The only remaining possibility is that both x i ∼ c(x i ) and x i ∼ c(x i ). In this case, we can see that core-stability implies either x i ∼ x i ∼ t i or x i ∼ x i ∼ f i but not both. Define the assignment that sets those variables x i true for which x i ∼ t i , and sets those variables x i false for which x i ∼ f i .
Soon we will need to know that π makes most players not very happy. Indeed, we claim that in π, clause players c k obtain utility 30, and y-literals obtain utility 0. This is because if any two of these players would obtain more in π, then case (b) of the Lemma applies, so that all clause players are together in π, and they are together with literals which include an x-literal. But we already know that x-literals are together with their t i or f i who hate a clause, contradicting feasibility of this giant coalition. Now take an arbitrary assignment to the y-variables, and suppose for a contradiction that under these assignments to the x-and y-variables the formula ϕ becomes false, so that ¬φ becomes true meaning each clause of ¬φ is true. Let S be the coalition consisting of all clauses c k , all true x-literals, and all true y-literals. In S, true x-literals obtain utility 5, y-literals obtain positive utility, and clauses obtain utility 31. Hence everyone in S is strictly better off in S than in π. Thus π is not core-stable, contradiction. Thus, ϕ must be true.
Conclusions and Open Problems
We have shown that deciding the existence of a core-or strict-core-stable partition in a given additive hedonic game is Σ p 2 -complete, and similarly that deciding the existence of a strict-core-stable partition in a boolean hedonic game is Σ p 2 -complete. This answers the complexity status of these questions conclusively, and implies that solving them is even harder than solving NPcomplete problems (unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses).
A class of hedonic games that on first sight behaves similarly to additively separable ones is the class of fractional hedonic games (FHGs) introduced by Aziz, Brandt, and Harrenstein (2014) . There agents care about the average, not the sum, of the values of the players in their coalitions. It would be interesting to see Σ p 2 -hardness results for this class of games; intuitively, a somewhat different approach is needed to tackle them since FHGs discriminate coalitions based on their size. In our reductions, coalitions of size 3 are treated similarly to giant coalitions of size n.
We also reiterate here a problem posed by Woeginger (2013a) : is strict-core-existence Σ p 2 -hard even for enemy-aversion games? These are additive hedonic games in which v i (j) ∈ {−∞, 1} for all agents i, j ∈ N . It appears that an entirely different approach is necessary for this setting. Partial progress on this problem is presented in Rey et al. (2015) .
